

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 ERDA-05 AF-10 ARA-10  
CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-07 PM-04 H-01 INR-07 L-03  
NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01  
PRS-01 OES-07 SS-15 USIA-06 DLOS-09 NRC-05 /147 W  
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FM USMISSION GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8784  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
USMISSION NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 GENEVA 5371

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PARM CCD  
SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES ON MULTILATERAL  
ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

1. SUMMARY: AT URGING OF SOVIET AMB ISSRAELYAN, AMB SLOSS AND US  
DEL TO SEABED TREATY REVIEW CONFERENCE MET WITH AMB ISSRAELYAN AND  
HIS COLLEAGUES FOR WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION OF MULTILATERAL ARMS  
CONTROL ISSUES. AMONG TOPICS COVERED WERE MBFR (REPORTED SEPTEL),  
CTB, CW, MDW, SUMMER SESSION OF THE CCD, UN SPECIAL SESSION ON  
DISARMAMENT WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, AND THE TREATY OF  
TIALELOCO. END SUMMARY.

2. BACKGROUND. DURING COURSE OF SEABED TREATY REVIEW CONFERENCE,  
SOVIET AMB ISSRAELYAN SEVERAL TIMES SUGGESTED TO US AMB SLOSS THAT  
REPS OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THEIR PRESENCE IN  
GENEVA FOR INFORMAL DISCUSSION OF RANGE OF MULTILATERAL ARMS  
CONTROL ISSUES. MEETING WAS HELD AT US MISSION IN GENEVA, JUNE 30  
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AND LASTED TWO HOURS. US PARTICIPANTS WERE SLOSS, TURRENTINE,  
THOMPSON AND WALDROP FROM SEABED DEL. SOVIET REPS WERE AMB ISSRAELYAN  
,  
STASHEVSKY, NARZARKIN AND SMIDOWITCH.

3. SLOSS INDICATED THAT THE THREE MAIN ISSUES BEFORE THE CCD ARE:  
A. COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN (CTB);

B. CHEMICAL WEAPONS LIMITATION (CW); AND NEW MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS (MDW).

WITH RESPECT TO THE FIRST TWO ISSUES, HE SAID THAT PROGRESS IN THE CCD IS DEPENDENT ON THE PROGRESS WE CAN MAKE IN THE CTB TRILATERAL (US, UK, USSR) AND CW BILATERAL (US, USSR) WORKING GROUPS.

4. CTB: SLOSS OBSERVED THAT THE MAIN DIFFERENCES IN THE US AND SOVIET POSITIONS ON CTB RELATE TO PNE'S AND VERIFICATION, AND NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN MOVEMENT IN THE SOVIET POSITION ON VERIFICATION AT THE UN LAST FALL. ISSRAELYAN RESPONDED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD COME FORWARD WITH THE VERIFICATION FORMULA THAT THEY PRESENTED AT THE 31ST UNGA LAST FALL IN AN ATTEMPT TO MEET SOME OF THE WESTERN CONCERNs, AND IN THIS REGARD ALSO NOTED THAT SOVIETS HAD JOINED SEISMIC EXPERTS GROUP. HE SAID THAT HE HAD NEVER THOUGHT THAT VERIFICATION WAS A REAL DIFFICULTY, AND THAT WITH "GOOD WILL" IT COULD BE RESOLVED. WITH RESPECT TO PARTICIPATION, ISSRAELYAN CONFIRMED THAT SOVIETS ARE READY TO "GO ALONG AT THE OUTSET WITHOUT THE FRENCH AND THE CHINESE", BUT NOTED THAT THIS POSITION HAS NOT YET BEEN REVEALED TO CCD. HE SAID THAT HE WAS SURPRISED THAT THE US HAD RAISED A NEW PROBLEM WITH RESPECT TO PNE'S, SINCE PNE TREATY CLEARLY "PROVIDES FOR PNE'S".

5. SLOSS RESPONDED THAT HE WAS SURPRISED THAT ISSRAELYAN WAS SURPRISED ON PNE ISSUE SINCE DURING NEGOTIATION OF PNE TREATY IT WAS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED THAT THERE WAS NO WAY FOR AN OUTSIDE CONFIDENTIAL

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OBSERVER TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE EXPLOSION OF A PNE DEVICE AND A NUCLEAR WEAPON. THE SOVIET SIDE RESPONDED THAT NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS WOULD TAKE PLACE ONLY AT NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST SITES WHICH MADE THEM DISTINCTIVE. ISSRAELYAN ADDED THAT US WOULD HAVE THE SAME OPPORTUNITY IF PNE'S ARE PERMITTED UNDER A CTB, SO NEITHER SIDE WOULD HAVE AN ADVANTAGE. SLOSS RESSPONDDED THAT A PNE EXCLUSION WOULD LEGITIMIZE ACTIONS SUCH AS THE INDIAN PNE, AND SHOULD BE OF CONCERN TO BOTH THE US AND USSR.

6. CTB AND CW: ISSRAELYAN THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO PRESENT A JOINT DOCUMENT TO CCD DURING THE SUMMER SESSION ON EITHER CTB OR CW, ALTHOUGH THERE MAY BE A BETTER CHANCE WITH REGARD TO CW. HE SAID THAT WE MUST BE ABLE TO PRESENT SOMETHING BEFORE THE START OF THE 1978 CCD SPRING SESSION. SLOSS SAID THAT HE WAS NOT QUITE SO PESSIMISTIC BUT THOUGHT IT USEFUL TO CONSIDER HOW TO DEAL WITH SUCH A CONTINGENCY. HE SAID THAT IF IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO PRESENT A JOINT PROPOSAL ON EITHER ISSUE BEFORE THE END OF THE SUMMER CCD SESSION, THEN PERHAPS IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO CONTINUE WORK AND ANNOUNCE AT THE UNGA THAT JOINT PRINCIPLES ARE READY. ISSRAELYAN THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA TO WORK OUT PRINCIPLES ON CW AND CTB, WHICH MIGHT PERMIT MORE RAPID PROGRESS. HE SAID THAT THIS WOULD ONLY BE POSSIBLE IF THERE

ARE NO DIFFERENCES "IN PRINCIPLE" IN THE JOINT PRINCIPLES.

7. MDW: WITH RESPECT TO MDW ISSRAELYAN SAID THAT IT COULD NOT BE A SUBSTITUTE FOR CTB AND CW, HOWEVER, IT MAY BE EASIER TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A SPECIFIC MDW MEASURE SUCH AS RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. HE SAID THAT THE US MAY BE UNDERESTIMATING THE PUBLIC APPEAL OF THE SOVIET MDW PROPOSAL IN WHICH HE THOUGHT THERE WAS GROWING INTEREST. SLOSS SAID THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF TRYING TO CLOSE OFF NEW MDW DOES HAVE APPEAL, BUT THAT THE US SIDE HAS HAD DIFFICULTY WITH THE QUESTION OF DEFINITION AND THE EXAMPLES WHICH THE SOVIET EXPERTS HAVE PRESENTED. ALSO, THE US DOUBTS THAT A SINGLE TREATY CAN COVER NEW MDW ADEQUATELY. ISSRAELYAN SUGGESTED THAT A REDEFINITION OF MDW MIGHT HELP AND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOME, "BUT NOT ALL" OF THE CRITICISM REGARDING THE SOVIET EXAMPLES OF

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NEW MDW WAS JUSTIFIED.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 GENEVA 5371

8. SEABEDS: ON THE QUESTION OF FURTHER ARMS LIMITATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE SEABEDS, SLOSS ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIETS HAVE ANY

SPECIFIC PROPOSALS IN MIND. ISSRAELYAN SAID NO BUT THAT THE USSR WOULD  
BE STUDYING THE QUESTION SO AS TO DEVELOP A PROPOSAL. SUCH A PRO-  
POSAL, HOWEVER, PROBABLY WILL NOT BE READY DURING CCD'S SUMMER SESSION.

SLOSS SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED, AND ISSRAELYAN INDICATED THERE WOULD BE  
CONSULTATIONS WITH THE US BEFORE SOVIETS MADE ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSALS  
IN CCD.

9. CCD: ISSRAELYAN INDICATED THAT IN RECENT NON-PROLIFERATION  
TALKS WITH THE FRENCH, IN PARIS DURING MAY AND IN MOSCOW DURING  
JUNE, FRENCH OFFICIALS HAD SHOWN GREATER INTEREST IN CCD THAN EVER  
BEFORE. HOWEVER, HE DID NOT SPECIFICALLY CONFIRM REPORTS WE HAVE  
HEARD FROM OTHER SOURCES HERE THAT FRENCH HAVE TOLD SOVIETS THEY  
WOULD JOIN CCD IF CO-CHAIRMANSHIP WERE ABOLISHED. IF THE FRENCH  
APPROACH THE US, ISSRAELYAN ASKED, AND SAY THAT THEY WOULD PARTICI-  
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PATE IN CCD IF THE US-SOVIET CO-CHAIRMANSHIP WERE ABOLISHED, WHAT  
WOULD THE US REPLY? SLOSS STATED THAT THE US WOULD WELCOME FRENCH  
PARTICIPATION IN CCD, BUT THAT THEY HAVE NEVER INDICATED TO US  
THAT THE CO-CHAIRMANSHIP IS THE ONLY OBSTACLE. THE US IS NOT  
RIGID ABOUT CCD'S STRUCTURE, BUT BEFORE AGREEING TO ANY CHANGE  
WE WOULD WANT TO ENSURE THAT THE RESULT WOULD BE TO STRENGTHEN THE  
COMMITTEE, AND WE WOULD WANT TO CONSULT WITH THE SOVIET UNION. SLOSS  
SAID THAT IN THE US VIEW CCD HAS THREE CHARACTERISTICS WHICH IT  
WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO PRESERVE: ITS LIMITED SIZE; THE CONSENSUS RULE;  
ITS INDEPENDENCE FROM THE UN. ISSRAELYAN AGREED WITH THESE POINTS  
AND STATED THAT WITH OR WITHOUT PROGRESS ON ITEMS BEING DISCUSSED  
IN CCD, DURING THE UNGA'S SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT  
(MAY-JUNE 1978) THERE WILL BE PRESSURES TO CHANGE THE CCD'S  
STRUCTURE, AND THAT IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE US AND USSR TO KEEP  
IN TOUCH.

10. SPECIAL SESSION AND WDC: ISSRAELYAN SAID SOVIETS SEE SPECIAL  
UNGA ON DISARMAMENT AS POTENTIAL "ACCELERATOR" FOR DISARMAMENT  
NEGOTIATIONS, BUT CONSIDER ITS IMPORTANCE LIMITED BECAUSE IT WILL  
NOT HAVE POWER TO NEGOTIATE AGREEMENTS ON "REAL DISARMAMENT."  
SOVIETS WERE CONCERNED, HE SAID, THAT SESSION WOULD AMOUNT TO A  
STAGESHOW, WITH NO SUBSTANTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENT. HE STRONGLY  
DEFENDED SOVIET POSITION THAT SPECIAL SESSION SHOULD LEAD TO  
CONVENING OF WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, DENYING THAT THIS WAS  
PROPAGANDA STANCE DESIGNED TO ISOLATE CHINESE AND EMBARRASS US.  
ISSRAELYAN INSISTED THAT, IN SOVIET VIEW, WDC IS A NECESSARY  
FORUM FOR PRAGMATIC DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS PARALLEL TO THOSE OF  
THE CCD AND OTHER EXISTING FORUMS. HE SAID HE WAS CONVINCED US WOULD  
COME AROUND TO SOVIET VIEW BY TIME OF THE SPECIAL SESSION. SLOSS  
REPLIED THAT US DOUBTS ABOUT WDC REMAIN UNALLAYED, NOTING THAT SOVIET  
S  
HAD NOT EXPLAINED HOW "NEGOTIATIONS" COULD BE ORGANIZED IN A

GLOBAL CONFERENCE, AND HOW IT WOULD RELATE TO WORK OF CCD.

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11. TLATELOLCO: AT END OF MEETING, ISSRAELYAN AND STASHEVSKY REFERRED TO US SIGNATURE OF PROTOCOL I OF TREATY OF TLATELOLCO, ASKING HOW US INTERPRETED PROTOCOL WITH RESPECT TO "STATIONING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN PUERTO RICO" ("AN OPEN SECRET," SAID STASHEVSKY), US SHIPS WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT GUANTANAMO, TRANSIT OF PANAMA CANAL, AND SUBMARINES IN HIGH SEAS OF THE TREATY'S "ZONE OF APPLICATION." SLOSS NOTED THAT RATIFICATION OF PROTOCOL WOULD CLEARLY PROHIBIT STATIONING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ANY US TERRITORY IN TREATY ZONE; THAT TRANSIT RIGHTS ARE NOT AFFECTED BY TREATY; AND THAT HIGH SEAS FREEDOMS ARE ALSO UNAFFECTED. NAZARKIN ASKED HOW US WOULD DEFINE "TRANSIT" -- A SHIP VISITING A PORT FOR AN HOUR, A DAY, OR A MONTH? SLOSS REPLIED THAT THIS WOULD BE A SUBJECT FOR A LEGAL OPINION, BUT NOTED THAT RULE OF REASON WOULD SEE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN A BRIEF STOP AND A MONTH-LONG VISIT. ISSRAELYAN DID NOT INDICATE WHETHER SOVIETS WERE RE-EXAMINING THEIR POSITION, THOUGH HIS QUESTION SUGGESTED CONTINUED SOVIET BELIEF THAT TREATY PREJUDICES HIGH SEAS FREEDOMS AND IS DEFICIENT IN NOT PROHIBITING TRANSIT.

12. AT CONCLUSION, ISSRAELYAN EXPRESSED SATISFACTION OVER MEETING, CALLING FOR BOTH SIDES TO KEEP IN CONTACT ON DISARMAMENT PROBLEMS. SORENSEN

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## Message Attributes

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